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Professor Richard Laughlin is renowned for applying critical insights from 
the German philosopher, Jurgen Habermas.  His middle-range work has 
explored many accounting problems such as public-private partnerships, 
health care reforms and how accounting impacts cultural issues.  Laughlin’s 
work re-conceptualises accountability in terms of cultural analysis, 
language and systems theory.  Users of his work may encounter issues 
associated with: (1) understanding how to judge assertoric statements 
concerning various truth claims; (2) exploring the separation between the 
secular and sacred: and (3) examining whether language simply designates 
meaning or opens us to interpretive new pathways. 
 
INTRODUCTION (Check all headings, including numbering, for consistency.) 
Richard Laughlin is renowned for his work which (‘which’ used for consistency as it is used 
elsewhere, and arguably it is the better relative pronoun) applies Jurgen Habermas’ critical 
theory to accounting.  He has written on topics including green accounting, health care 
reforms, public-private partnerships and accounting’s impact on cultural variables.  This 
commentary focuses on issues researchers may confront when utilising Laughlin’s critical 
theory, also known as a middle range research approach. 
                                                          
1  The title is derived from a theme in Herder, J. G. (1969), “On the Origin of Language”, Barnard, F.M. 




 Laughlin’s work on critical accounting explores accounting in its environmental and 
social contexts.  He uses Habermas’ critical and linguistic theories which can be examined in 
the light of more expansive language approaches.  The commentary analyses Laughlin’s 
critical and middle range research approach ((1) inverted commas deleted because not used in 
your first reference to the term and (2) is the hyphen in ‘middle range’ needed? I have 
removed it. But see my later comment on p. 4.) by drawing on debates about the role of 
language.  This debate provides a means to benchmark whether a middle range research 
approach can address the colonising and alienating impacts of accounting,  
The argument then considers Laughlin’s adaptations to Habermas’s model to explore 
connections between accounting and the public spaces in society.  A possible solution to 
these accountability and democratic limitations (what are the limitations? – may need to 
explain here) is to consider different approaches to language and associations with the 
middle-range research approach (Laughlin, 1995; Broadbent and Laughlin, 2004).2  These 
limitations reflect dissatisfaction with current reforms to social and environmental 
accounting.3 It is suggested that these are uncritical reflections of more abstract debates in 
the sociological literature. 
Laughlin’s contribution is examined in three sections.  The first section analyses 
Laughlin’s utilization of Habermas’ procedural approach. The second section examines 
Laughlin’s utilization of Habermas (in distinction to Habermas’s ‘procedural approach’?), 
and the third section discusses Laughlin’s work on the secular and sacred dichotomy (would 
‘work on the dichotomy between the secular and the sacred’ read better?)  in an 
                                                          
2 See Humphrey and Owen, 2000; Gray, 2002; Owen, et. al., 2001; Townley, et al., 2003) Habermas connects 
social validity claims with speech-acts in his development of the work of Austin, Chomsky, Searle and 
Wittgenstein.  According to Habermas (1990, p. 66) ‘only those norms can claim to be valid that meet (or could 
meet) with the approval of all those affected in their capacity as participants in a practical discourse’. 
 
3 See Gray (2000) who has argued that the corporation is an inappropriate vehicle to enact social change and has 




accountability context.  This examination is undertaken in relation to Laughlin’s argument 
concerning the public sector, public-private partnerships, regulation and the sacred-secular 
relationship in modern communities.  The issue to keep in mind is that Laughlin’s accounting 
considers reason, rationality and social/environmental auditing. 
 
1) LAUGHIN, ACCOUNTABILITY AND JUDGEMENT 
Research informed by Laughlin’s accounting system involves tracing complex connections 
between the current language of accounting and how these ideas are integrated in current 
social systems.  The question for accounting researchers is not only the explanatory power of 
the model, but whether this framework has the potential to create change. 
 From the preceding, it is then important to examine the nexus between language 
theory and accountability research.  This has the potential to create further problems when 
examining connections between accounting and other interpretations of language (i.e., 
Gadamer (1990), Dreyfus (1994) and Taylor (1991, 2003, 2007).  Thus, this examination and 
analysis concern accounting connections between accounting, language and moral theory.  
These considerations reflect the supposition that to focus on language as a rule procedure, as 
opposed to appreciating common goods exist, is a major problem for accounting.  This focus 
on the regulative role of accounting tends to obscure, rather than reveal, the common values 
of significance which confront the world.  On this view the mysteries of the origin of 
language present themselves and can be revealed through hermeneutic analysis. 
The theme of accountability change involves whether moral accounting contexts can 
be solved using a procedural model (ISS). (What is ISS?) Furthermore, the extent to which 
Habermas offered a middle range research approach is problematic.  One may ask how to 
determine the truth of assertoric truth claims?   It is, therefore, important to remember that 
Habermas associated his work on decision, judgement and morality with Kant’s principles of 
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justice.  Nevertheless, Laughlin’s Habermasian analysis of the political-economy of 
accounting shuttles between a skeletal ontology and empirical observation.  The aim is to 
imagine what accounting ought to be and here Laughlin turned to Merton’s framework to 
enrich the skeletal ontology (Why bold? And below?) with empirical contextualisation.  
 It is therefore important to remember Laughlin’s pragmatism builds on 
Habermas’s work.  He acknowledges the important role that Merton’s analysis plays in 
explaining social behaviour. (Set on US English – appropriate?)  Laughlin has stated that 
he differs from Merton through a focus on the ideas and values in the social setting.  
Laughlin has noted that his aim is to engage with value judgements while avoiding ‘a 
pervasive concern with consolidating special theories into more generalisable theories’ 
(Merton, 1968, pp. 52-53 found in Laughlin, 1995, p. 79). Later (where?), he added that: 
 
The “middle range” that is referred to below has no faith in the 
development of such a general theory.  Put simply the “middle range” of 
this essay maintains that there can only ever be “skeletal” theories in social 
phenomena – the hope for a grand theory, similar to Parsonian thought, is 
wistful and incorrect quasi-scientific thinking of a highly questionable 
nature.  But this is only one of the areas of difference – the “middle range” 
thinking in this essay also differs to Merton’s emphasis on methodology 
(with its desire finally, although maybe immediately, to adopt highly 
theoretical methods for investigation) and change with its purposeful 
distance from getting involved in any value judgements about what is being 
investigated. (I note that you have referred to ‘middle range’ with both a 
hyphen and without. What does Loughlin do? This should be the way you  
use the term throughout that paper and which may cause a need to correct 




The implied supposition is that accounting is a pragmatic practice which moves in a space of 
reasoning.  The accountability and accounting problematic (problem?) involves the question 
concerning whether Habermas’s model can assess communication which is incompatible with 
the good or better life through his formal model of discourse (Habermas, 1993, pp. 56-57).  
This model shapes Habermas’s development of a procedure that substantive claims must pass 
in order to be normatively valid. 
 This (should you make clear what ‘this’ is?) is the focus of Habermas which is subtly 
altered in Laughlin’s critical discursive analysis of organisations or organisational accounting 
systems.  He explicitly states (you have used the present tense previously) that this process 
can be guided by certain skeletal prior theories.  So even though the nature of the discursive 
process can provide a way to judge the quality of understanding this is not independent of the 
prior theories or the ontological and other assumptions that feed into the discursive process.  
These theories, however, are not some abstracted notion about right and wrong or 
sacred and secular. These subtleties and nuances are somewhat lacking in an analysis 
that focuses solely on different approaches to the role of language.   
This issue becomes clear in 
Laughlin and Gray (2012).  















 ‘Yet these concerns are vital as a precursor for understanding what the nature of D should be, 
the organisational issues that need to be discovered (i.e. the linkage between C and D) and 
how this should lead to relevant forms of accountability to societal values (i.e. the linkage 
between D and A).  Understanding of these interconnections is a challenge with which 
humanity continues to grapple.  Our point here is, though, that it is the lack of recognition 
that we do not understand and are not consciously addressing these connections that remains 
the worrying part of the papers in the special issue and, as we will see, subsequent work. 
(Laughlin and Gray, 2012).’ (page number?) 
 Laughlin and Gray (2012) point out that accounting research must grapple with 
connections between civil society, corporations, economics, people and society.  The 
theoretical thicket is about how middle range research utilizes Habermas’s more recent work.  
In his recent work, Habermas returns to Kant’s emphasis on the regulative ideals in the ideal 
speech situation – hereafter referred to as ISS. (Referred to earlier.) The accountability and 
accounting problem involves whether Habermas’s model can assess communication which is 
incompatible with the good or better life.  That is, where the good life involves developing 
the connections outlined in Laughlin and Gray’s Figure 1. (Expression in reference to 
figure?) The question confronting researchers is whether his formal model of discourse can 
achieve its desired reconciliatory aims and objectives (Habermas, 1993, pp. 56-57). 
 As noted earlier, Habermas develops a procedure in which substantive claims must be 
critically examined to become normatively valid.  This test consists of universal rules of 
discourse – reciprocal accountability, inclusiveness, freedom to question claims and to 
presuppose counter-claims, and non-coercion.4  These reflect the legitimate procedural 
                                                          
4 Habermas (1993, pp. 56–57) states that ‘we presuppose a dialogical situation that satisfies ideal conditions in a 
number of respects, including…freedom of access, equal rights to participate, truthfulness on the part of 
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constraints that citizens are entitled to make, which indicate the basis for rational agreement 
regarding the ‘justness’ of a given norm, and that of other assertoric statements.  One 
difficulty that researchers may encounter is how Laughlin’s ISS work combines with middle-
range thinking.  This involves examining the extent to which middle range research reveals 
the social forces that operate in organizational and synchronic social space.  These 
forces involve relationships and their diachronic moments embedded in the ideal speech 
situation (ISS). (Use of ISS here is not made clear.) 
In their paper ‘Recent Financial and Administrative Changes in the NHS: A Critical 
Theory Analysis’, Broadbent, Laughlin and Read (1991) argue for accounting’s regulative 
role.  They explain (argue?) that ‘the evaluatory model [should concentrate] on judging the 
constitutive or regulative characteristics from the organizational systems viewpoint 
(Broadbent, Laughlin and Read, 1991, pp. 9-10).  These observations (arguments?) take us 
back to Laughlin’s work on the role of language as an iterative or constative process.  He 
explains: 
 
Constative speech acts are the mechanisms we use to represent social reality 
(e.g. the above analysis of fund accounting) which, in turn, create validity 
claims concerning the truth or falsity of these views.  Where there are 
differences of opinion about the accuracy of the insights these can, 
according to Habermas, be resolved through adopting a process called 
‘radicalised theoretical discourse’ which uses further constative speech act 
processes to challenge and question any insights forthcoming. (Laughlin, 
1987, p. 493). 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    




Laughlin focuses on constative terms which are those words and sentences that can correctly 
or incorrectly represent reality.  Accordingly, our constative speech claims can be assessed as 
true or false.  Yet, it is useful to remember that there is more to the functioning role of 
language than constative, designative or procedural structures.  That is, language performs 
functions associated with the acknowledgement of others, assertoric statements and 
commissive and directive commands. 
 The argument presented in this commentary is not claiming that Laughlin’s analysis is 
shaped solely by constative speech acts.  Rather, Laughlin is concerned with how ‘constative’ 
(why inverted commas here?) speech acts involve a series of stages.  The first state reflects 
certain ‘Formulation of Critical Theorems’ and ‘Processes of Enlightenment’ stages (see 
Laughlin (1987) for more details).  His third stage is termed ‘Radicalised Theoretical 
Discourse’ which comes into play when no ‘grounded or justified consensus’ can be found.  
Yet, a critical model (has been?) built on constative terms being right or wrong.  The point is 
that Laughlin seems to be taking Habermas’s thought in a more interpretivist direction.  This 
involves expressive and performative speech utterances.  The expressive dimensions in 
language have the potential to open to us new visions of our place in the natural environment. 
 Furthermore, it is important to remember that Laughlin is concerned with ‘regulative’ 
speech acts and ‘Radicalised Practical Discourse’.  These are in his third ‘Selection of 
Strategies’ stage where the ‘Selection of Strategies’ stage goes beyond the first two 
understanding stages – the first of which is generated by researchers and the second by 
researchers and organisational stakeholders (the unfortunately named ‘researched’ in 
Laughlin (1987)) together – to what should be done with this understanding in terms of 
change in the phenomena being explored.  This final stage has to be led by the 
enlightened ‘researched’ since it is their organisation that is being analysed.  Not to 
cover all these stages is to miss an appreciation of the overall process that Laughlin is 
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putting forward.  That is, Laughlin argues that his work moves beyond understanding 
to critique and change.  The argument takes us beyond Habermas’s more recent 
Kantian direction that knowledge is grounded in a priori principles. 
 Critics of Habermas have pointed out that the role of language cannot be simply 
reduced to constatives terms, nor can the rhetorical role of language be simply tested through 
processes of radicalised theoretical discourse.  Rather, this critical commentary focuses on 
Laughlin’s overall process about whether language must be probed from a totally different 
angle.  The point is that the Habermasian base requires more analysis.  At one level, words 
and statements cannot be assumed to correctly designate meaning and reflect reality.  Rather, 
it is language (do you mean language more broadly, rather than words and statemnts?)  which 
reflects our being-in-the-world and challenges accounting researchers to rethink its 
communicative roles in the public spheres of liberal democratic societies. 
 Laughlin’s early work followed Habermas in arguing that constative claims to truth – 
through radicalized theoretical discourse – act as means to adjudicate on the desired social 
changes.  These features have an operative effect on actual discourse such that it is possible 
to regard outcomes are assured and extend to both consensual and non-consensual discourse. 
(Having trouble with this sentence – do you mean ‘as assured’?)  As Habermas observes: 
‘[t]his becomes reasonable only if our scrutiny of the process does not uncover obvious 
exclusions, suppression of arguments, manipulation, self-deception, and the like (2003b, p. 
108).  In this sense, Laughlin’s model operates with pragmatic standards to self-correcting 
the direction of the life-world.  The present concern is whether accountability and 
organisational structures must be regulated through procedures in the discursive realm.  This 
poses a further question concerning whether the organisational form can deliver social change 
if it is constrained by Habermas’s procedural model. 
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 For accounting researchers, the question is how to determine the capacity 
(capabilities) of organizations to deliver the desired changes.  These are particularly 
important questions given that modern social and accountability theory is confronted with a 
richly textured, multidisciplinary conceptual foundation for analysis and research on 
corporate social change activities.  Here Laughlin’s work with Michael Power focuses on the 
regulative ideal as a means to consider the actual and possible roles for accounting (Power 
and Laughlin, 1996, p. 448)5.  They state: 
 
What remains important to a critical theory of accounting which follows 
Habermas’s later work is not so much an ability to give ex ante a clear criterion 
for distinguishing between legitimate and illegitimate roles of accounting and the 
law, but some kind of explicit commitment to this as a regulative ideal which 
moves in the theoretical space between the actual and the possible. (Power and 
Laughlin, 1996, p. 448) 
 
From this perspective, the focus turns to Habermas’s consensus-building strategy and aims to 
transform our basic institutions to create openness and critical space in the public sphere.  
Indeed, Broadbent and Laughlin claimed that public institutions must satisfy the need ‘for 
some debate about what these institutions are actually trying to achieve’ (Broadbent and 
Laughlin, 1993, p. 364).  This debate involves rethinking how democratic institutions can be 
(re)-informed using technologies such as accounting.  The question that confronts researchers 
is how the skeletal ontology combines with the regulative ideals? 
                                                          
 
5 Power and Laughlin (1996) have unpacked this notion in their accountability interpretation of Habermas’ 
Between Facts and Norms which integrate two famous strands of thought.  One strand of thought is based on 
the ideas of Hegel and the other on the ideas of Kant.  Habermas combines their ideas to offer a model where 





2) LAUGHLIN: EXPLORING THE SACRED AND SECULAR 
It is important to remember that Laughlin explores (I have changed this verb to the present 
tense, here and elsewhere, to be consistent with your general use of the present tense.) the 
role secular values play in society long before it became a key consideration in modern social 
theory.  Laughlin uses Habermas’s method to understand the contexts from which certain 
discursive claims emanate.  It is interesting to observe that he had already begun to explore 
these questions long before recent exchanges between Jurgen Habermas and Charles Taylor.  
Recent work by Habermas and Taylor has involved uncovering the contours of our present 
cultural and social predicaments by examining the role of the secularisation processes. 
 Indeed, it is fascinating to find in Laughlin’s early work his examination of 
accounting systems in the Church of England.  This research examined how accounting 
systems emphasised certain processes and not others.  Laughlin (1987) reflected: (I have 
left this in the past tense because it seems right as you are specifically referring to past 
work.) 
 
Laughlin (1984,1986) traces the reasons for the rudimentary nature of 
accounting systems in the Church of England to central cultural factors 
concerned with the significance of the sacred and the downgrading of all 





The issue boils down to whether accounting merely reflects a secular ideal or moves in the 
logical space of reasons.  Recent philosophical work detailing the contours of the relationship 
between sacred and secular asked us how we are to account, explore and understand these 
values that shape our being-in-the-world.  The research issue involves whether Habermas’s 
approach encompasses such method, and the extent to which Laughlin has taken it in broader 
interpretivist directions. 
 The research considers the extent to which Habermasian inspired middle range 
connects with Habermas’s most recent work.  Indeed, Laughlin’s work on the sacred seems to 
conflict with the abstract and procedural focus that is becoming more evident in Habermas’s 
work.  This leads to arguments concerning how Laughlin has taken an interpretivist direction 
to disclose how accounting systems relate to religious and other organisational settings.  
Furthermore, in his work on the Church of England he uncovered additional accountability 
issues concerning the alleged divide between the spheres of the sacred and secular.  He did 
not, however, posit any simplistic correlation. 
 Laughlin attempts to avoid simplistic correlations by taking language in a more 
interpretivist direction.  This is the challenge he presents for organisational theorists 
concerned with tracing the impacts of organisational procedure on culture, difference and 
identity.  Jacobs and Walker (2004) explain that Laughlin’s (1988, 1990) study of the 
accounting systems of the Church of England has proved a significant contribution to this 
accountability literature.  They point out that he explains how accounting do play an 
important role in the life of the church, but accounting and budgeting are irrelevant to the 
‘ongoing life of the parish’ and are ‘an unhealthy intrusion’ (p. 23) to spiritual values.  Jacobs 
and Walker review Laughlin’s reflections on Emile Durkheim (1976) and Eliade (1959) to 
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explore how accounting practices were associated with the profane or secular as opposed to 
the sacred.  Jacobs and Walker (2003) observe: 
In the Church of England considerable effort was taken to keep the secular 
aspects of accounting separate from, and subservient to, the sacred centres 
and activities of the Church.  Booth (1993) explored similar themes in his 
study of the Australian Uniting Church.  Booth’s (1993) work reinforced 
the distinction between the sacred activity of the Church and the secular 
functions of accounting and administration.  The work of Laughlin (1988, 
1990) and Booth (1993) and the resulting concept of the sacred-secular 
divide has set the context for much of the subsequent research into the role 
of accounting in religious organisations. (Jacobs and Walker, 2003, p. 362). 
 
Critics claim that Laughlin has constructed a sacred-secular divide (Hardy and Ballis, 2003; 
Irvine, 2002; Jacobs, 2003).  This research has tended to preclude the possibility that 
accounting can play a role in the spiritual practices, spirituality and theology of religious 
organisations.  These authors have suggested that there are problems with a strict structuralist 
sacred/secular divide and that accounting can play important roles in areas, organisations and 
practices which have been seen as sacred.  For example, Peter Booth perpetuates this view 
when he argues that Laughlin (1987) created a bifurcation between the sacred and secular.  
Booth then argues that all accounting is secular and ignores important identity-forming 
factors.  But Laughlin’s analysis is not merely about accounting as a secular process because 
language is used to discover the impacts of accounting systems in organisations. 
 Again these insights involve exploring whether accounting perpetuates secularisation 
processes.  What are the effects?  Arguably, the distinctions between the sacred and secular 
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exhibit some similarities with the debates between Kantians and Heideggerianss.  The first 
point to remember is that both sets of theorists explain the role of belief in understanding the 
sacred.  For Heideggerians, it is the Habermasian/Kantian approach which is too abstract, 
ahistorical and asocial.  Arguably, their arguments detach the background that shapes our 
being and it is these social forces which perpetuate processes of disenchantment and 
secularisation.  While Heideggerian interpretation expresses concern with the abstract and 
procedural approaches within Habermasian/Kantian approaches. 
 Briefly, the issue for accounting researchers is whether Habermasians and Kantians 
lose sight of the particular.  This is the arena where culture itself becomes of critical concern 
in a world of half-understood cultural disharmony.  This philosophical problem haunts 
universal approaches such as Habermas’s model.  This is how accounting impacts on 
communities and people’s lives.  Yet, the question remains whether the Habermasian 
approach provides enough space in its vision of the public sphere not to impose value 
systems on others.  A further issue arises concerning recent philosophical debates highlight 
further problems for the sacred (Habermas, 2011; Taylor, 2011).  Charles Taylor asks 
Habermas how he discriminates and determines the validity of discourse on the basis of such 
deep psychological background?  Can people’s background horizons of value be made 
explicit in the manner Habermas seems to suggest?  For the middle range research approach 
it is problematic whether it reveals the deeper motivations that have created the separation 
between the sacred and secular? 
 As modern social science research indicates the number one problem facing 
accounting is how to combine differences in a world of half understood cultural 
fragmentation.  The issue confronting theory is that block thinking cuts us from richer 
sources of motivation.  Laughlin attempts to avoid such charges by interpreting Habermas’s 
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ideal speech model as a process-based research vehicle.  It is therefore a processual (technical 
term?) middle range approach as opposed to an idealised model. 
 Thus, by carefully reading Laughlin (1986) the key focus is to understand ‘what is 
going on’ in organisational settings.  The framework therefore is about understanding the 
problems for communication when constructing procedure and rule focussed strategies for 
change.  It is therefore a category error to argue that Laughlin simply follows Habermas and 
ends up with a procedural accounting model.  However, a careful reading of Laughlin shows 
that his work charts the forces and vectors of power that are operating within organisational 
settings. 
 From a broader philosophical perspective, the supposition that accounting may 
uncover and interpret ‘what is going’ suggests subtle departures from Habermas’s major 
work on the idealised speech situation.  It will be recalled that for Habermas the problem 
reflects curtailing the power of language to restrict people’s freedom of choice.  Habermas’s 
advice is to create regulative ideals to order cultural and political differences.  Taylor points 
out that more research is needed concerning ‘the psychological background that Kantians 
have and so on, and why they get excited by certain things which don’t excite me’ (Taylor, 
2011). 
 Accounting researchers need to consider how these complex debates impact on real 
world problems.  In Laughlin (1987) the role of language involved constative speech acts.  It 
will be recalled that these terms involved the mechanisms to arrive at consensual outcomes in 
organisational settings.  It seems, however, that Laughlin operates with a richer 
understanding of the role of language.  This richer approach to language has the potential to 
re-enchant our understanding of the sacred.  This would take us in a direction different from 
Habermas’s infatuation with Kantian deductions and abstractions from real world settings.   
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 That is, Laughlin’s work on sacred values reveals significant identity forming features 
which can be excluded if we enter the idealised discourse arena.  While Habermas 
emphasises the abstract nature of discourse, it seems that Laughlin stresses a process-based 
understanding of language.  Clearly, what emerges from these debates is that Habermas is 
trying to unpack how reasons perpetuate the deep anxieties many people feel when living in 
the modern world.  Here Taylor’s question to Habermas is relevant in exploring language and 
reason when he asks: ‘what has that got to do with the discourse out there?  Can people not 
understand it?  Why discriminate on those grounds? (a closing inverted comma here?)  
Habermas responds: 
 
How to settle this background consensus in the first place, if not within, so 
to say, a space of neutral reasons?  And “neutral” now in a peculiar sense.  
They are secular in a non-Christian sense of secularization, for one reason. 
This, truly, you have described so wonderfully in your A Secular Age.  
Secularization from within the church means tearing down the walls of the 
monasteries and getting the serious commands of the Lord and the appeal 
for imitatio Christi. […] This is secularization from within the Christian 
community. (Habermas, 2011, p. 65). 
For Habermas, the difference is that religious utterances belong to a kind of category of 
discourse in which you (we?) do not just move within a worldview or within a cognitive 
interpretation of a domain of human life.  For accounting researchers, the task is to explore 
such processes of reasoning and how they are communicated through relevant publics.  
Again, Habermas’s recent work abstracts from the process and interpretivist focus that 
Laughlin initiated in his (1987) paper.  From a philosophical perspective, Taylor expresses 
17 
 
concern about how you can express your experience in a manner which is not tied up with 
your membership in a community.  Habermas argues that Taylor’s talk about being created in 
God’s image is, in our tradition, easily translatable into secular propositions.  For Habermas 
this derives from the Kantian concept of autonomy or from a particular interpretation of being 
equipped with human rights (Habermas, 2011, p. 63). 
 Taylor responds by explaining that he is telling another story about the psychological 
background that Kantians and Habermasians use.  Habermas argues that the difference is that 
religious utterances belong to a kind of category of discourse in which ‘you do not just move 
within a worldview or within a cognitive interpretation of a domain of human life’ 
(Habermas, 2011, p. 63).  For critical researchers, Habermas invites us to consider the 
motivations that led us toward the neutral decision model – the ideal speech situation.  
Habermas argues that: 
‘there is no reason to oppose one sort of reason (secular against religious 
reasons or Hegelian) simply because many people find religious reasons are 
coming out of a world view which is inherently irrational.’ (Habermas, 
2011, p. 61). 
The purpose of the analysis is to understand how our common human reason works in 
religious traditions, as well as in any other cultural enterprise, including science.  So there is 
no difference on balance.  Habermas continues: 
 
However, if it comes to lumping together Kantianism and utilitarianism, 
Hegelianism and so on with religious doctrines, then I would say there are 
differences in kind between reasons.  One way to put it is that ‘secular’ 
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reasons can be expressed in ‘public’, or generally shared, language.  This is 
the conventional sense that Chuck [Taylor] is trying to circumvent by 
introducing the term official language.  Anyhow, secular reasons, in this 
sense belong to a context of assumptions—in this case to a philosophical 
approach, which is distinguished from any kind of religious tradition by the 
fact that it doesn’t require membership in a community of believers.  By 
using any kind of religious reasons, you are implicitly appealing to 
membership in a corresponding religious community.  Only if one is a 
member and can speak in the first person from within a particular religious 
tradition does one share a specific kind of experience on which religious 
convictions and reasons depend. (Habermas, 2011, p. 61). 
 
Habermas is avoiding the argument that he ranks differences and does not reconcile them.  
For Habermas, the key issue involves how we emerge from participating in cultic practices in 
which reasons are tied to membership.  This is the central difference between interpretations 
concerning the role of language and middle-range thought.  Moreover, these interpretations 
have important implications on how we account, interpret and recognise different kinds of 
reasons. 
 For accounting researchers, the question boils down to Laughlin’s predilection 
for abstraction or interpretation.  Additionally, what impact would this have on the 
middle-range approach and its application to organisational theory.   For Habermas, 
what is not taken into account and which is abstracted from in secular space is the 
giving and taking reasons in terms of cultic practices.  Secondly, there is no reference to 
getting socialized in a religious community that can be traced back in the five or four 
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great world religions to a historical thinker or historical origins, and is continued 
through a doctrine and the interpretation of such a doctrine.  Habermas’s recent works 
explain how this socialisation is related to an ‘understanding of what it means to refer, in our 
kind of religions, to a kind of revealed truth’.  He wants to demarcate different kinds of 
reasons and states that it is difficult to explain what it means outside those traditions.  
 In recent works, Habermas offers a personal statement that he was raised as a 
Lutheran Protestant and now is agnostic.  It is these experiences which are abstracted from in 
the public sphere and must be given expression in our accounts.  This process of abstraction 
is what gives rise to the difference between religious and secular reasons for Habermas.  
While he argues that you (Again, I think that the use of ‘you’ in formal writing is 
questionable. As noted above, I suggest ‘we’ – as apposed to the stilted ‘one’.) have to 
abstract from these spaces if you enter a discussion between Kantians and Utilitarians.  That 
is, with Kantian and Utilitarian reasons there is no internally connected specific path to 
salvation, a path to salvation which considerably enhances religion, as we understand it.  A 
path to salvation means follow an exemplary figure which draws its authority from ancient 
origins or testimony.  Thus, the key difference is that for Taylor it is impossible to abstract 
from, or prescind from, the differences among deep commitments, comprehensive world 
views, whether they are grounded religiously or otherwise.  On this view, the fundamental 
discursive issue is that we cannot abstract enough to carry on the discourse and settle things 
discursively, from any of these kinds of deep constitutive commitments.  Therefore religion is 
not a special case. 
 
3) LAUGHLIN: THE FORCE OF THE EXAMPLE.  DOES LANGUAGE 
DESIGNATIVE OR DISCLOSE NEW WORLDS 
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To date, it has been argued that Laughlin offers a somewhat different role for language in 
accounting and organisational theory.  This leads Habermas to argue that not only are there 
differences between types of reasons, but also that the role of language must be constrained.  
It is the seductive powers of language which must be curtailed in the public sphere.  The 
argument is that Laughlin’s work can be extended to focus on how language opens us to new 
worlds.  Language is not simply a designative method but an iterative process that can lead to 
improved interpretations.   
 Again, briefly, the debate between Habermas and Taylor concerns the inter-subjective 
and objective role that is performed by language.  Put differently, how language relates to 
conversation and discourse to cultivate the possibilities for a good life.  It is interesting to 
observe that despite their differences both Habermas and Taylor base their work on ideas 
from Johann Herder and Humboldt.  They are Counter-Enlightenment thinkers who have 
focussed on political problems emanating from Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason.  The 
relevance is that Laughlin seems to adapt their approach to language as opposed to the 
designative and instrumental approach that Habermas has championed.  Laughlin’s approach 
can be taken in a more expressive approach echoing Taylor’s civilising research involving 
communication, language and moral progress. 
 Laughlin’s interpretation of Habermas emphasises reconciling differences.  He does 
not seem to call for constraints on language in his radicalised discourse model for middle 
range research.  These are important points if accounting is to free itself of dubious truth 
claims and conceptual frameworks.  Indeed, the previous sections outline how Laughlin has 
adapted Habermas’s work as a processing device which tests validity claims against reality.  
It has been argued that Habermas’s major work displayed some distinctive characteristics 
which inform the idealised discourse ethic model.  These are important issues when trying to 
understand the role of accounting and language in globalising, international and secularising 
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world orders.  These observations are made in purview of the disharmony between cultures.  
Intensifying levels of disharmony between groups reflects communicative problems in a 
world of half understood political differences. 
 On these matters, Laughlin asks his interlocutors to provide examples.  The obvious 
example is the difference between the religious and the secular which formed the basis of his 
early work (Laughlin, 1987).  A second example is the difference between Habermas and 
Taylor on cultural politics: the accounting implication involves how these interpretations are 
likely to play out when accounting for change in globalising regulative space.  Consider, for 
example, Habermas’s concern with Taylor’s analysis of language and interpretation.  He 
believes that communitarians will promote certain cultures over others.  Habermas explains 
that Taylor’s understanding of language is like an ecological perspective on species 
preservation cannot be transferred to cultures.  He argues that the problem for cultural 
heritages and the forms of life articulated in them influence personal structures and motivate 
them to continue the traditions.  Habermas continues: 
The constitutional state can make this hermeneutic achievement of the 
cultural reproduction of the life-worlds possible, but it cannot guarantee it.  
For to guarantee survival would necessarily rob the members of the very 
freedom to say yes or no that is necessary if they are to appropriate and 
preserve their cultural heritage.  When a culture has become reflexive, the 
only traditions and forms of life that can sustain themselves are those that 
bind their members while at the same time subjecting themselves to critical 
examination and leaving later generations the option of learning from other 





Habermas argues that Taylorian communitarians are likely to impose cultural politics on 
minority groups.  For research about accounting, the issue involves not simply interpreting 
what is going on within organisations but the impact of procedure.  The accountability issue 
is what can accounting do to democratise its standard-setting processes. 
 These issues lie at the heart of Habermas’s concern with Taylor’s communitarian 
thought.  This concern involves cultural ‘survivance’ at the expense of individual rights.  It 
will be recalled that Habermas’s concern is that Taylor supports cultural rights.  This problem 
has haunted not only cultural but also environmental thinkers who are accused of suppressing 
individual rights.  For Habermas it is the search for universal principles in the chaotic and 
ultimately indeterminate universe, which must be the focus of discourse ethics.  The search 
for these principles in discourse set a procedural test which substantive claims must pass in 
order to be normatively valid.  They consist in the universal rules of discourse which reflect 
the problem solving power of language, and these rules are at the disposal of each individual 
agent to affirm or reject the norms and expectations.  The issue for Laughlin is whether these 
problems extend to their work. 
 Habermas maintains that language offers a unique opportunity to construct a decision 
model where differences can be solved once and for all by setting and applying a rule in the 
discourse arena.  In an accounting context, it seems that Laughlin operates with a much richer 
conception of the good society than Habermas would seem to support.  Laughlin’s aim is to 
locate the sources which shape accounting systems.  The question for accounting researchers 
is to understand Laughlin’s extensions to Habermas’s model and how language shapes our 
culture. 
 For interpretivists such as Taylor, the work of Herder and Hamann offer means to 
explain language’s role in communities.  For his part, Taylor believes that Habermas ignores 
the nexus between the structure and practice of language, thereby seriously under-theorising 
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the background contexts which shape people’s being.  This is where the nuances of culture 
and the life-world impact on the formation of a language.  Habermas responds and maintains 
that: 
 
Of course Humboldt is not an empiricist trying to pull the rug out from 
under the feet of the process of reaching understanding and hold the identity 
of linguistic meanings to emanate from the randomly iterated intentions – 
constantly superseding each other – of single, isolated speakers.  For him, 
the intersubjectivity of a common perspective does not dissolve, for 
example, into a series of isolated I-perspectives which are merely reflected 
in one another; rather, it arises at the same time; and from the same source 
as intersubjective validity of semantically identical linguistic expressions 
and is of equal origin (gleich-ursprunglich). (Habermas, Justification and 
Application, op. cit., pp. 56–57). 
 
Habermas argues that Taylor’s Hegelian focus is on the ‘we’ perspective implicit in language, 
which leads to the socialisation of individuals within practices that abrogate personal rights.  
Here, the purpose of Habermas’s model is to assess communication which is incompatible 
with the good or better life.  This was the point of Habermas’s procedural test that substantive 
claims must pass in order to be normatively valid.  This test consists in universal rules of 
discourse – reciprocal accountability, inclusiveness, freedom to question claims and to 
presuppose counter-claims, and non-coercion.6  These reflect the legitimate procedural 
                                                          
6 Habermas, J., Justification and Application, Cambridge, Massachusetts, The MIT Press, 1993, pp. 56–
57 where he states that ‘we presuppose a dialogical situation that satisfies ideal conditions in a number 
of respects, including…freedom of access, equal rights to participate, truthfulness on the part of 
participants, absence of coercion in taking positions, and so forth’ (p. 56).  Found initially in Porter, 




constraints we are entitled to make which indicate the basis for rational agreement regarding 
the ‘justness’ of a given norm, and of assertoric statements. 
For Taylor it is problematic whether Habermas has provided a full analysis of the 
connections between speech acts and validity claims.  Taylor continues with the argument 
that language and discourse can be used to disclose new worlds through an ongoing 
conversation of humanity and opens up new attitudes toward the other.7   
 
7. CONCLUSION 
This paper has argued that Habermasian thinking has offered important insights for the 
purposes of accounting and accountability research.  Laughlin’s work on language theory 
provides a means to bring about change in civil society and questions whether language does 
more than designate meaning.  This paper, however, has offered a different way to think 
about language as a medium through which ideas, nuances and meaning unfold as 
conversation proceeds.  Thus, this paper suggests a critically oriented research agenda for the 
future would focus not only on the individual but also on the common goods that accounting 
affects.  Indeed, a possible line of counter-argument has been envisaged that the arguments in 
this paper by responding that neither pragmatic proposals, nor theoretically developed 
alternatives, have been offered.  (I have trouble with the structure and meaning of this 
sentence.) 
 From the Gadamer-Taylor point of view, the argument is that problematizing received 
knowledge is a constructive contribution in itself without it being linked to specific 
alternatives.  This paper, therefore, offers a fundamental challenge to our received wisdom 
and has criticised the fundamental assumptions of accounting and corporate social 
responsibility. 
                                                          
7 Taylor, ‘A Reply, op. cit., pp. 216–217. 
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The arguments in this paper began with the proposition that Habermas’s universal 
linguistic strategy is appealing to accountants in that it offers a way to test whether maxims 
are either valid or invalid (true or false). (Need to fix on one or the other, I think. Does 
validity/invalidity apply to maxims? Perhaps in an everyday meaning. It may be truth/falsity 
if they are considered to be assertions - but as rules? But see comment on p. 26 re this.)  Yet, 
language can be considered from an entirely different perspective.  Taylor extended 
Gadamer’s argument that language is not exhausted by procedure; rather, it offers a means to 
create richer interpretations and thereby broaden horizons.  Language, like life itself, can 
never be reduced to procedure and rule-driven principles of rational calculation.  A broader 
vision, presented as it is by our language abilities, has the potential to illuminate middle range 
accounting.  That is, language is not a tool at the hands of any one interlocutor, but reflects 
interpretation, nuances and ambiguities which make up the world.  Through conversation and 
dialogue we may clarify ideas, values and the maxims which confront people.  In this way it 
is possible that accountability research contributes to solutions to problems associated with 
difference and diversity. 
A central supposition of this paper has been that Gadamer and Taylor both share a 
perspective that problems emerge when Habermas separates ethics from morality, truth from 
rightness, and interpretation from scientific precision.  These issues have implications for 
Habermasian inspired middle range writers who focus on pragmatic change, public sector 
reform, managerialism, performance measures and key performance indicators. These issues 
have implications for users of Habermas’s ideas, especially those middle range accounting 
writers who focus on pragmatic change.  However, pragmatism itself requires more detailed 
analysis in the accounting literature as it is also concerned with our more basic commonalities 
with the natural environment.  Pragmatists are also concerned that rule-procedure over 
interpretation reflects Habermas’s assumption that a democratic system assumes that in 
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allowing people to assert facts they will be transformed by the force of the better argument.  
This central Habermasian assumption was seen to be problematic in that measuring up to a 
set of rules like those expounded by Habermas misses the point that reconciliation and 
transformation involves a process of enrichment, engagement and dialogic interaction. 
For accountability purposes, Habermasian reforms must be examined through a 
dialogic lens to express the limits of a procedural modus operandi.  In contrast, Gadamer and 
Taylor offer a dialogic model which engages with others who are different.  A fundamental 
claim was that their thinking exposes the illusion that words and language function as tools 
which can be controlled and measured.  Rather, it is humanity’s capacity to express thoughts 
through language which offers a richer way to analyse the world.  This way of thinking, in 
turn, impacts on accounting and reporting functions.  This cannot be achieved when language 
is constrained and reduced to a tool at the disposal of interlocutors who must abstract from 
their reality to test the validity of their maxims. (Here the use of validity seems OK – so 
perhaps its use earlier is OK too.)  
Yet, language does not function as a precise and austere instrument at our control.  
We do not have complete mastery over the structures of language and communication; they 
are like a web which is more than its parts.  Perhaps Laughlin’s research could be taken in an 
accountability direction that engages Habermas’s warning that we must be wary of most of 
the power within and through language.  Future research informed by Laughlin’s work might 
develop the connections between constatives, references and differences in language.  This 
would seem to accord with Laughlin’s own middle range perspective that accounting not just 
follow a rule but give public ‘voice’ to the concerns of critical accounting.   
In our present austere times this is an increasingly important but unfortunately 
marginal activity.  Implementing this broader way of thinking about language does not 
diminish this need.  A final point is encapsulated in Habermas’s famous statement ‘that the 
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